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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In their brief the Appellees continue their quest to punish the Appellants for failing 
to do the impossible. Their motions, and the District Court's orders, punished the 
Kilpatrick Plaintiffs for not complying with an order that they were unaware of and 
which, in the case of the wrongful death heirs, did not even apply to them. Not satisfied 
with those impossibilities, the defendants now claim the punishment for Plaintiffs in both 
cases is appropriate because Plaintiffs5 counsel was aware of the order and can be 
responsible for failing to comply with it. Of course, this position ignores the undisputed 
fact that Plaintiffs' counsel did not become aware of either client's death until after Mr. 
Kilpatrick was already cremated and after Mr. Kirkham was already buried, making it 
impossible for counsel to insure compliance with the order. Seeking even more 
impossibility, appellees claim Plaintiffs are barred from challenging the Case 
Management Order on appeal because they did not challenge it in the trial court. 
Defendants totally ignore the impossibility of challenging a case management order 
which had been in full force and effect for over two years before the death of Mr. 
Kilpatrick, and over four years before the Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss. 
Not satisfied with impossibility, the Defendant apellees also seek to have this court 
apply fiction to uphold the trial court's order. In the Kilpatrick case, they claim the 
Plaintiff heirs are bound by the actions of their personal representative. But the acts that 
they claim resulted in the heir's loss of any right to pursue their case ail occurred before 
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there was a personal representative. They also seek to create the fiction that Plaintiffs5 
counsel supported the autopsy requirement of the case management order. They rely on 
Plaintiffs' counsel's arguments against defense efforts to make the autopsy requirement 
even more burdensome as some sort of supposed evidence that Plaintiffs supported the 
autopsy requirement. But even in those efforts they cannot bring themselves to argue 
directly that Plaintiffs' counsel supported the autopsy requirement because they know 
such an assertion would be false. 
Finally, appellees seek to rely on so called evidence submitted in their replies to 
Plaintiffs' opposition to their motions for dismissal to demonstrate that the autopsy 
requirement of the case management order is correct. The problem with this reliance is 
that the so called evidence was submitted in the reply when Plaintiffs had no opportunity 
to respond to it. Further, the so called evidence itself is hearsay without authentication. 
Finally, the so called evidence is all supposed "science" that is twenty years or more old 
and which by its own terms defeats the claim that autopsy is "necessary" in every asbestos 
death case. 
Because the orders of the District Court dismissing these cases for lack of autopsy 
are without authority and an abuse of discretion, this court should reverse the orders and 
remand the cases to the District Court for further proceedings. 
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IL 
ARGUMENT 
A- This Court Has Jurisdiction Over The Kilpatrick Appeal Which Is 
Timely as to Both Defendants and Both Orders of The Court 
Defendant Burlington Northern and Santa Fe ("BNSF") argues that this court does 
not have jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' appeal of the order dismissing BNSF. The rather 
unique basis for this position is Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs did not timely appeal 
the order of dismissal. At the time the order was entered, Plaintiffs sought certification of 
the order for interlocutory appeal under Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b). The court entered a minute 
order authorizing appeal and directing that a formal order be filed. No such order was 
ever completed. Defendant recognizes that a minute order which directs further action is 
NOT a final order for purposes of appeal. See Brief of Appellees, page 20, footnote 2 
(citing State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2 f 9, 65 P.3d 1180, 1182-83). Yet, Defendant then 
claims, without any rationale or support, that the rule does not apply here. But the rule 
does apply here, and the minute order certifying interlocutory appeal did not start the time 
running for Plaintiffs to appeal. 
Defendant then claims that even if the interlocutory appeal was not approved, the 
court still has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal against BNSF because Plaintiffs' notice of 
appeal did not include the Order of Dismissal of BNSF. Once again BNSF demonstrates 
that it understands the law: that an appeal of a final disposition of a case does not require 
that every interlocutory order in the action be listed in the notice of appeal in order to be 
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appealable. See Brief of Appellees, pages 20-21, footnote 3 (citing Scudder v. Kennecott 
Copper Corp., 886 P.2d. 48, 50 (Utah 1994). Yet, once again BNSF claims the law does 
not apply to it. The trial court's order dismissing every cause of action against Bullough, 
the final defendant in the case, recited by its own terms that it constituted "the order 
regarding the matters addressed herein. No further order is required." This final order 
made all other interlocutory orders in the case appealable, including the order dismissing 
BNSF. 
But even if the defendant is correct and this is not a final judgment subsuming all 
interlocutory orders, on its face it includes the order dismissing BNSF. The order recites 
it is the Order regarding the matters addressed herein. One of those matters, plainly set 
out in the order, is "the Court's Decision pertaining to the issue with respect to Defendant 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company." By its own terms both dismissals 
are included in this final order. There is no question that the Plaintiffs' notice of appeal 
of this order was timely. Because it was, and because the court's final order made both 
orders appealable, both are properly before this court. 
B. Plaintiffs Did Not Have the Opportunity to Challenge The Autopsy 
Requirement of the Case Management Order. Counsel's Objection to 
Its Inclusion in That Order Preserves the Issue on Appeal 
Seeking to add additional impossibilities to the Plaintiffs' burden, appellees ask 
this court to rule that the challenge to the trial court's autopsy requirement in the case 
management order may not be raised on appeal because it was not raised in opposition to 
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the motions to dismiss. As Appellants pointed out in their opening briefs, they had no 
ability to comply with the order much less an ability to challenge it. 
Defendants attempt to treat this "discovery order" as a typical request for discovery 
from one party to another which is pursued unsuccessfully and then reinforced by an 
order of the court. But that is clearly not the nature of the order in this case. The court's 
case management order applies to all asbestos cases filed by Plaintiffs' counsel. 
Individual plaintiffs are not subject to individual discovery orders. The order applies as 
soon as they file their action, whether they are aware of it or not. In the case of Mrs. 
Kilpatrick, the record is clear. She was not even aware of the order until after her 
husband was cremated. Yet, Defendants claim her appeal is barred because she did not 
oppose the order in the trial court. They fail, however, to explain just how she should 
have accomplished this impossibility. 
Plaintiffs had no opportunity to oppose the court's autopsy order in the trial court. 
The only opportunity they had was to oppose the proposed sanction for violating that 
order. This they did with vigor. But the Defendants are not assisted by the Plaintiffs' 
alleged failure, because there was no failure. In their brief, appellees identify the fact that 
Plaintiffs' counsel and the court both discussed and agreed that Plaintiffs' counsel had 
opposed inclusion of the autopsy requirement in the court's case management order. 
Having opposed inclusion of the requirement in the order, counsel has preserved that 
challenge to the order on appeal. Defendants cannot have it both ways. They cannot 
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claim that Plaintiffs' counsel's objection to the order did not preserve the issue on appeal 
while claiming later, as they do, that Plaintiffs are bound by their failure to follow the 
order because their Counsel knew of its terms. 
The motion before the court was a motion to dismiss for violating the case 
management order. It was not a motion to determine whether an order for an autopsy 
should be issued. That had already happened. The law does not require a party to object 
to a request for a discovery order and then to object to it again when the other party seeks 
to enforce it Having unsuccessfully objected to the imposition of the order, counsel is 
not expected to, nor would it be properly respectful of the court to again challenge the 
court's decision to impose the order. At the hearing in this matter counsel was opposing a 
request for sanctions. The challenge to the order itself was preserved earlier, and the 
challenge to the sanction was properly preserved at the hearing. 
Appellees are similarly inaccurate in their argument that Plaintiffs waived any 
challenge to the autopsy requirement when their counsel opposed modifications to the 
case management order. In their statement of facts, Defendants quote comments from 
various papers submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel in opposition to defense efforts to change 
the case management order. Those innocuous comments point out that the order was the 
product of extensive negotiations, that Plaintiffs did not prevail in all their positions, and 
that the autopsy requirement should not be made more onerous than it already was Brief 
of Appellees at 1L These statements are far from either admissions of support for, 
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adoption of, or waiver of the Plaintiffs' objections to the court's autopsy requirement. 
For appellees to suggest that they are is totally disingenuous. There has been neither a 
failure to challenge the order nor a waiver of any such challenge. The issue is properly 
before this court. 
C. Appellees Inappropriately Rely On So Called "Evidence" of the 
Need for Autopsies in Asbestos Cases. 
In another attempt to misdirect the issues in this court, appellees rely on supposed 
"evidence" supplied in their reply to Plaintiffs' opposition to their motion to dismiss. 
They claim this scientific evidence of the need for an autopsy in asbestos cases supports 
the court's case management order autopsy requirement and demonstrates the 
appropriateness of that order. There are several problems with appellees position. 
First, the so called evidence provided by the appellees was provided in support of 
their motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for violation of the court's case management 
order autopsy requirement. Their motion was not addressed to the appropriateness of the 
autopsy requirement. The issue, as noted above, was the appropriateness of applying a 
sanction for violation of the order. Because the scientific basis for the order was not 
raised in the defendant's motion, there was no reason for Plaintiffs to submit scientific 
evidence in their opposition. The court had already entered its order years before, and the 
only question was whether to issue a sanction, and if so, what that sanction should be. 
Because the so called "evidence" was submitted in the reply, Plaintiffs had no opportunity 
to rebut it. 
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Second, the so called evidence is hearsay. All of the submission consists of 
excerpts from articles apparently taken from various publications. But each of the 
presentations stands as the classic definition of hearsay — an out of court statement 
presented in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted. As such, the information is 
inadmissible under Rule 802 of the UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. Appellents suspect the 
appellees will argue that the supposed evidence is admissible under one of two exceptions 
two the hearsay rule set out in Rule 803 of the UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, but that is not 
the case. 
Because of the age of the documents presented - all over 20 years - defendants 
will likely argue that the documents are admissible under Rule 803 (16) which provides 
an exemption for "statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the 
authenticity of which is established." The problem with that position would be that 
nothing in the defendant's submission establishes the authenticity of the documents. And 
nothing in the documents themselves meets the standards of Rule 902 of the UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE authentication. 
Defendants might also argue that the documents are admissible as learned treatises 
under Rule 803(18) of the UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. This exception clearly does not 
apply because Rule 803(18) requires that the statements in learned treatises be adopted by 
the testimony of an expert witness before they may be admitted in evidence. And even 
then, the statements may only be read into evidence. The documents themselves may not 
8 
be presented into evidence. 
Third, and most significantly, the documents presented by the defendants in their 
reply do not support the underlying rationale of the Case Management Order that an 
autopsy is required for diagnosis in every asbestos case. A few samples of the statements 
contained in the articles demonstrate that the Defendant's own so called evidence disputes 
their position that autopsy is required in all cases. Defendants relied on and cited to 
Andrew Churg M.D. & Francis H.Y. Green M.D., Pathology of Occupational Lung 
Disease, 224 (1988). But that document makes it clear that autopsy is not only not 
required in every case, it is not even the primary method of diagnosis: 
IDENTIFICATION OF ASBESTOS IN HUMAN LUNG 
It should be remembered that routine gross and microscopic examination, 
coupled with appropriate clinical and radiographic data, are the primary 
methods of diagnosis in asbestos-related disease. Analysis of asbestos 
bodies or fibers are adjunctive methods to be used when necessary, but they 
are by no means necessary in every case. (Emphasis in original) 
In the Kirkham case, defendants, in their reply brief, relied on "Tumors and 
Pseudotumors of the Serous Membranes," McCaughey, et dX., Atlas of Tumor Pathology, 
Second Series, 1985. But, at page 70 of that document, the authors note: 
Role of Autopsy 
Although an autopsy has been regarded in the past as essential for sure 
diagnosis of diffuse mesothelioma, increasing experience has made it clear 
that the tumor can often be accurately identified at an earlier stage on the 
basis of its gross distribution as defined radiologically or at operation and 
its cytologic and histologic characteristics. 
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Defendant's appendix at 6. Of further significance is the age of all the supposed 
scientific evidence presented by the Defendants in their replies to the motions and 
recycled in their Brief of Appellees. Though dealing with scientific inquiry and medical 
evidence and research, defendants cite to only articles which are twenty years or more 
old. The only appropriate conclusion from that fact is that more recent publications do 
not support the dated conclusions advanced by the Defendants. 
D. Mr. Kilpatrick's Heirs Cannot be Denied the Benefit of Their 
Claims by Actions Which Occurred Prior to the Appointment of 
Their Personal Representative 
Appellees seek to impose further impossibility in this case by claiming that Mr. 
Kilpatrick's wrongful death heirs have no claim in this matter because they are bound by 
the actions of their personal representative. They correctly point out that under Utah law 
the personal representative acts for the benefit of the heirs. And they further correctly 
note that the heirs are bound by the actions and decisions of the personal representative. 
What they mistakenly or disingenuously ignore, is that Mrs. Kilpatrick took no action as 
the personal representative in this case that is the basis for the trial court's decision. At 
the time Mr. Kilpatrick died on July 5, 2003 and was cremated, there was no personal 
representative in this case. Mrs. Kilpatrick was not appointed the personal representative 
until May 27, 2004. Mrs. Kilpatrick did nothing as the personal representative that 
violated any order imposed upon her by the court. Therefore, the claims of the heirs 
cannot be barred by the actions of their personal representative. 
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In the same way, BNSF cannot benefit by its reliance on the fact that all the 
Kilpatrick's claims against it were based on the Federal Employers Liability Act 
("FELA"). As Appellants pointed out in their opening brief, and appellees did not 
dispute in their brief, Mr. Kilpatrick did nothing to impair his claims against BNSF. The 
only claim permissible under FELA, that of the employee, was unimpaired at the time of 
his death. When Mrs. Kilpatrick was appointed the personal representative months later, 
she gained the entitlement to continue that case for the benefit of herself and the heirs. 
Nothing she has done in her role as the personal representative has impaired her claims or 
those of the heirs she represents. Consequently, the court's order dismissing those claims 
is legally incorrect. 
E. The Court Abused Its Discretion by Dismissing the Plaintiffs9 
Cases Where There Was No Evidence of Fault 
Appellants made clear in their opening briefs that the court had abused its 
discretion by dismissing their cases when there was no evidence of fault to support the 
dismissal. The standards imposed by Utah courts for imposition of a discovery sanction 
are clear: 
Imposing sanctions for a party's refusal to respond to a court order 
compelling discovery is a harsh sanction and therefore, requires "a showing 
of 'willfulness, bad faith, or fault' on the part of the non-complying party." 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 684 P.2d at 1266 (quoting Societe Internationale v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958)). "Willful 
failure" has been defined as " 'any intentional failure as distinguished from 
involuntary noncompliance.'" 
Arnica Mm. Ins. Co. v. Schenler 768 P.2d 950, 961-62 (Utah App.,1989). Defendants 
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recognize the requirement for a finding of "willfulness, bad faith, or fault" in order to 
impose a sanction of dismissal, but fail to demonstrate in any way how any of the 
Plaintiffs in either of these cases is guilty of any of those things. Rather, they simply say 
"mere fault is sufficient." Brief of Appellees at 37. True as it may be that fault is 
sufficient reason to impose a dismissal sanction, there must be some showing of fault. 
None has been shown here. The appellees have not demonstrated how a plaintiff who 
was unaware of the order, or her counsel who was unaware of the client's death could 
have complied with the court's autopsy order or how their failure to perform that 
impossibility turned into "fault" 
The simple fact is that there was no fault on the part of the Plaintiffs. The trial 
court never sought any fault and did not impose the sanction based upon fault. The court 
simply imposed the dismissal sanction because no autopsy was conducted. Because the 
mandatory prerequisites for imposition of the dismissal sanction - willfullness, bad faith, 
or fault - were not present, the court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction. This 
court must reverse that decision. 
Ill 
CONCLUSION 
The Brief of Appellees has presented no substantial reason for this court to uphold 
the trial court's rulings. In addition to expecting the impossible by expecting compliance 
with an order the Plaintiffs were unaware of, they seek support in the hearsay, 
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unauthenticated, so-called evidence that Plaintiffs had no chance to rebut and which was 
not relevant to their motion which sought not to impose an autopsy requirement, but to 
impose a sanction for violating it. They also incorrectly seek to deprive Plaintiffs of a 
wrongful death action because of the actions of their personal representative when the 
actions they rely on occurred long before a personal representative was appointed. 
The record here is clear. The court imposed the very extreme sanction of dismissal 
without making the required prerequisite findings of wilfulness, bad faith, or fault. 
Without such a finding, the sanction was an abuse of discretion and cannot stand. 
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs in both of these actions respectfully request that this court 
reverse the orders of dismissal and remand these cases for discovery and trial. 
r—+H 
DATED this I> day of December, 2007. 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
Rbbdtt G. pilcttrist 
Bronson D. Bills 
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